C hapter 2 considers poverty in monetary terms. Using income or the monetary value of consumption as a basis for defining the poor is appealing on several grounds. It allows for different preferences in purchases, the definition of a poverty threshold in "objective" ways (such as the cost of a minimum-calorie diet), and aggregation across domains (the value of food and nonfood consumed).
Yet, income fails to provide a complete picture of well-being for several reasons. First, many aspects of well-being are not just difficult to price but valuable in ways that cannot be monetized (Sandel 2012; Sen 1985) . For example, commoditizing the right to vote by allowing people to sell it would yield a market value of voting rights that would not capture the full meaning and value of the right as an expression of citizenship and political participation. The list of difficult-to-monetize aspects of wellbeing is long, including the ability to read and write, longevity and good health, security, political freedoms, social acceptance and status, and the ability to move and connect.
Second, the benefit of income can be limited when it interacts with other conditions. The benefits of a bicycle as a means of transport, for example, are quite different for an able-bodied and a handicapped person. Such resources are instrumentally valuable; they have no intrinsic value. Relying on their monetary valuation as a measure of well-being can therefore be misleading.
Third, income measures are at the household level, which assumes the equal distribution of income across household members. Yet intrahousehold inequalities in the distribution of household income across household members can be substantial (Chiappori and Meghir 2015 ; see box 4.3 in chapter 4). Direct information on individuals avoids this strong assumption.
This chapter briefly reviews how the capability approach motivates a nonmonetary multidimensional perspective on poverty. It then assesses Africa's progress in literacy and education, life expectancy and health, freedom from violence, and self-determination (freedom to decide). It devotes special attention to displaced and disabled people, two vulnerable groups that are rarely covered in standard poverty reports (because of data limitations). Finally, it considers the four dimensions of well-being jointly, in order to identify countries and individuals that are deprived in multiple dimensions.
The Capability Approach Sen (1980 Sen ( , 1985 Sen ( , 1999 proposes the capability approach as an alternative to monetary measures of poverty. This approach focuses on what people effectively do and are (their functionings) and on the capacity of people to freely choose and achieve these functionings (that is, their capability) rather than on the commodities bought or consumed. There is broad consensus that functionings such as the ability to read and write and being well nourished, healthy, and free from violence and oppression are vital for human development. They are ontological needs (stemming from the condition of being human) that apply to every person regardless of geographic location or time (Max-Neef, Elizalde, and Hopenhayn 1991) . Focusing on individual achievements in these areas thus provides a good basis to begin assessing poverty from a nonmonetary perspective.
Education, health, and security also expand the choices people can make and the range of things they can do and be (that is, their capabilities). But they are not sufficient. Social and political institutions often impede self-realization. Basic personal and political freedoms are equally essential. To appreciate the importance of opportunity and choice for assessing well-being, consider two people, both teachers. One chooses teaching from among a range of occupational options. The other becomes a teacher because other, preferred options are excluded because of cultural constraints (engineering is closed to women) or location (engineering jobs are not available in remote villages) or because someone else chose the profession for her (Foster 2011) . Can they be considered equally well off? Clearly, personal autonomy and selfdetermination matter for well-being. The study of outcomes should not be indifferent to the process by which the choice was made.
The capability approach provides the philosophical underpinnings for the nonmonetary perspective on poverty examined in this chapter. Sen's vision of capabilities and functionings also underlies the rich and vibrant literature on multidimensional poverty (Alkire 2008; Bourguignon and Chakravarty 2003; Robeyns 2005; Sen 1999) .
Using the capability approach to measure well-being is challenging. There are some common approaches to measuring certain basic functionings, such as the ability to read and write, adequate nourishment, and good health, even though measurement issues remain here as well (de Walque and Filmer 2012; UNESCO 2015) . There is much less experience in measuring other functionings (including mobility, social integration, and even the capacity to aspire) and in measuring capability. An added complexity is determining thresholds below which a person is considered poor, as these cutoffs arguably depend on the individual's choices and preferences. Finally, there is the challenge of aggregation. For example, how much poorer should a person be considered when deprived in several functionings compared to when deprived in only one?
The human development index (HDI) and the multidimensional poverty index (MPI) (Alkire and Santos 2014) are applications of the capability approach to assessing progress in societies. 1 Both indexes focus on achievements in education, longevity/health, and living standards (through income and assets). The approach pursued in this chapter is in this tradition, though with a different emphasis in three areas.
First, to provide a more comprehensive view of people's basic capabilities, the chapter considers two additional dimensions: freedom from violence and the opportunity for self-determination (freedom to decide). Poverty analyses have largely ignored these dimensions.
Second, the degree of joint deprivation is explored by estimating the share of people deprived in one, two, and more dimensions. This approach achieves a middle ground between a single index of poverty (which requires weighting achievements in the various dimensions) and a dashboard approach (which simply lists achievements dimension by dimension, ignoring jointness in deprivation) (Ferreira and Lugo 2013) .
Third, the focus is on outcomes measured at the individual (not the household) level. Where data on outcomes are not available, information on inputs (such as use of bednets and vaccination rates in lieu of disease prevalence measures) and proximate measures (such as governance indicators for freedom to decide) are used.
Data on nonmonetary dimensions of poverty are now much more widely and more regularly available than they once were, including at the individual level. This follows the rapid expansion and public availability of the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), as well as the Africa-wide and globally comparable national opinion surveys, such as the Afrobarometer, the Gallup World Poll, and Subjective measures of well-being reflect utility as a mental state (happiness) or as a cognitive reflection of the condition of one's life. Unlike income measures of poverty, they do not rely on prices or monetary valuations, although they include both monetary and nonmonetary dimensions of wellbeing. These measures are based on the personal evaluation of individuals themselves, reflecting the value attached to individual sovereignty. Being onedimensional, they facilitate complete orderings.
Answers to subjective well-being questions, such as questions based on ordinal questions about happiness, economic welfare, or life satisfaction, are intuitive and not time consuming to collect. They confirm that many dimensions beyond income and material consumption-health, job market status, the quality of relations and social interactions, and even political rights and freedom of speech (Frey and Stutzer 2002) -matter and that happiness and life satisfaction increase with income at a declining pace (or not at all beyond a certain level of income, according to the Easterlin paradox (Easterlin 1974) , though the existence of this paradox remains debated [Stevenson and Wolfers 2008] ).
One challenge with subjective well-being is the lack of a common frame of reference. As individuals adapt their tastes and aspirations to their circumstances, intrapersonal comparisons over time and interpersonal comparisons become difficult. Adaptation of happiness standards and aspirations-lowering them when conditions go awry and raising them when conditions improve-are pervasive worldwide. Countries with higher rates of HIV prevalence, for example, do not systematically report lower life satisfaction (Deaton 2008) ; people who lose limbs still record good well-being scores (Loewenstein and Ubel 2008; Oswald and Powdthavee 2008) .
The subjective well-being approach also does not adjust for individual tastes or aspirations. This could lead to paradoxical policy actions, such as redistribution from poor happy subsistence farmers to unhappy millionaires. Subjective well-being data may therefore not yet be appropriate to monitor living standards. They do, however, contain important complementary information about people's preferences that could help inform policy makers about how to value public goods or weight nonmonetary dimensions of well-being (Decanq, Fleurbaey, and Schokkaert 2015) or set the poverty line (Ravallion 2012) . As the capability approach emphasizes, personal preferences and choices cannot be ignored in assessing an individual's level of poverty and wellbeing. How to use questions about subjective wellbeing to learn about those aspects of people's preferences that policymakers want to take on board is an important research agenda.
BOX 3.1 How useful are subjective data in monitoring poverty?
the World Value Surveys. These data enable the much wider dimensional and more individualistic scope of this chapter. Some of the concerns regarding data availability, comparability, and quality highlighted in the context of the expenditure surveys apply here as well, however. Their implications are discussed throughout the chapter where relevant.
There has also been an upsurge in the availability and use of subjective measures of well-being and poverty, such as measures based on ordinal questions about happiness or life satisfaction (box 3.1). Given the lack of a common frame of reference, which makes it difficult to compare across people and time, these measures are not used here to assess poverty.
Levels of and Trends in Well-Being Education and Literacy
Education can expand people's capabilities. It helps people access and digest information and knowledge. Doing so requires at a minimum being literate. The focus here is mainly on adult literacy rates: the percentage of adults who can, with understanding, read and write a short, simple statement about their everyday lives.
Adult literacy rates evolve slowly in the absence of effective large-scale adult education programs, because their evolution is influenced mainly by the literacy levels of younger cohorts. Current school enrollment rates and test scores are therefore also considered, to assess how adult literacy is likely to evolve.
Africa's literacy rate stood at 58 percent in 2012: more than two in five Africans cannot read or write a sentence (figure 3.1 and box 3.2). There has been progress, but it has been slow. Between 1995 and 2012, the literacy level in the region increased by 4 percentage Source: EDSTAT data. Note: The adult literacy rate is the percent of the population 15 and older that can, with understanding, read and write a short, simple statement about their everyday lives. Missing years were inter-or extrapolated.
points, despite a rapid increase in primary enrollment rates since 2000. This change compares unfavorably with the 17 percentage point increase in South Asia and in the Middle East and North Africa and the 10 percentage point increase in East Asia and Pacific, where the literacy rate is approaching 93 percent.
This low average for Africa masks substantial variation within the region. More than half the population is illiterate in seven countries, almost all of them in West Africa (figure 3.2). Niger (with an adult literacy rate of only 15 percent) and Guinea (where the rate is just 25 percent) have the lowest literacy levels in Africa. At the other extreme, literacy levels exceed 90 percent in Equatorial Guinea and South Africa, and they exceed 70 percent in some poor and fragile countries as well, such as Eritrea and Zimbabwe.
The gender literacy gap remains high, averaging about 25 percentage points, although gender parity in education is one of the Millennium Development Goals on which Africa has performed best. Gender parity in literacy is especially low in West Africa (figure 3.3).
This gap partly accounts for the low levels of overall adult literacy there. Gender parity is much higher in Southern Africa. The ratio of literate women to literate men is only 0.32 in Guinea and 0.38 in Niger. In contrast, women are more likely to be literate than men in Lesotho (1.34) and Namibia (1.08).
What traits of households and countries explain the gender gap in literacy? Overall, female illiteracy rates are substantially higher in low-income countries than in Following the launch of the Education for All initiative in 2000, much effort has been devoted to monitoring adult literacy. Nonetheless, data on adult literacy are still collected relatively infrequently, and both the definitions and methods of measurement keep changing, raising validity and comparability issues similar to the ones encountered in compiling expenditure data for poverty tracking (see chapter 1). On the upside, the UNESCO Institute for Statistics provides detailed and publicly accessible metadata of the data sources, definitions, and actual measures used (UNESCO 2015) .
For the period 1995-2012, 109 annual literacy estimates are available-13 percent of the total possible number of 828 (18 years * 46 countries [no literacy data are available for Somalia and South Sudan]). Although the figure seems low, annual changes in literacy rates are small, meaning that the small number of estimates is less important than it would otherwise be. A more relevant metric is the number of countries with two or more surveys or censuses to estimate literacy rates and the proximity of the data sources to the beginning and end points of the study period (1995 and 2012) .
On this count the picture is better. Only four countries, which together represent 6.4 percent of the 2013 African population, have only one estimate; the remaining 42 have two or more records. For these countries, linear interpolation and extrapolation are used to fill in the missing years. For countries with only one observation, the average African trend was applied to extrapolate. The average population-weighted literacy estimate in each country is 4.5 years removed from 1995 and 3.3 years from 2012. Given the small annual change in literacy rates, the trends reported here are thus reasonably well supported by actual data, despite the small number of observations.
How Literacy rates obtained through direct assessments were 8 percentage points lower on average across a sample of 20 countries (UNESCO 2015) . Their increased use may partly explain why Africa's recorded progress on adult literacy has not been more rapid.
The measure of literacy as the self-or proxydeclared ability to read and write only a short simple statement about everyday life is rudimentary. Literacy today is seen as a "continuum of skills, such as the ability to identify, understand, interpret, create, communicate, and compute using printed and written materials associated with varied contexts, that enables individuals to achieve their goals in work and life and participate fully in society" (UNESCO 2015, 137) . This shift toward a more demanding notion of literacy mirrors the notion of rising poverty lines as countries develop.
BOX 3.2 Tracking adult literacy with data remains challenging
higher-income countries (by about 32 percentage points in upper-middle-income and high-income countries and about 14 percentage points in low-middle-income countries) (figure 3.4). In resource-rich countries, however, illiteracy rates are about 3 percentage points higher than in resource-poor countries (irrespective of the country's income level, landlockedness, or fragility), indicating that governance factors matter. Women in poor rural households are 36 percent more likely to be illiterate than their urban counterparts in richer households. Literacy is positively correlated with being divorced, widowed, or single (20 percent less likely to be illiterate). Illiteracy is much lower among younger people, holding hope for gender parity and overall literacy levels.
Progress has been slow despite the rapid increase in gross primary school enrollment, which rose from 75 percent in 1995 to 106 percent in 2012. figure 3 .6). The change makes the region one of the strongest recent performers in the world, above South Asia, where life expectancy increased by 6.0 years since 1995. This progress follows directly from the rapid decline in under-five mortality rates in the region.
Even so, at 57 years, life expectancy in the region remains well below the average rate for the world (70.9 years). At the current annual rate of increase, it will take about two decades to reach the levels in South Asia (almost 67 in 2013), which lags other regions by several years.
Healthy life expectancy in Africa was 49 years in 2012, 8 years less than total life expectancy (WHO 2015) . The gender gap favors women: in 2012 African women could expect to live 1.6 years longer in good health than men. 4 As with literacy, the differences in healthy life expectancy across countries are significant, ranging from 39 to o r o s R w a n d a G h a n a C o n g o , R e p . C a m e r o o n K e n y a T a n z a n ia U g a n d a S u d a n E r it r e a S ã o T o m é a n d . R e p . M a u r it a n i a C e n t r a l A f r i c a n R e p u b l i c B e n i n L ib e r ia N ig e r G u in in resource-rich countries have life spans that are 4.5 years shorter than people born in non-resource-rich countries (a difference of about 10 percent), after controlling for income level, fragility, and landlockedness. People in upper-middle-income and highincome countries can expect to live in good health 6.5 years longer than people in lowincome countries, after controlling for the other country traits. People in coastal countries also have higher healthy life expectancy. Under-five mortality and HIV prevalence. Two mortality indicators are significant drivers of changes in life expectancy in Africa: under-five mortality rates and HIV prevalence rates. For every 10 additional children per 1,000 live births surviving to the age of five, life expectancy increased by 0.7 years; for every percentage point increase in HIV prevalence, life expectancy decreased by 1 year. These two factors alone explain more than three-quarters of the variation in life expectancy in the region (under-five mortality explains 50 percentage points and HIV Note: Immunization measles age group is 12-23 months. Immunization DTP3 age group is 12-23 months. Measles age group is 1-59 months. Pertussis age group is 0-4 years. Tetanus age group is 0-4 years. DTP = diphtheria, tetanus, and pertussis.
prevalence explains 28 percentage points). Country gross domestic product (GDP) levels and the number of deaths from conflict in previous years do not have important effects on life expectancy beyond their effects on child mortality or HIV prevalence. 5 The decline in the under-five mortality rate-from 173 in 1995 to 92 in 2013-went hand-in-hand with the increase in immunization rates and the decline in the incidence of malaria-related deaths (figure 3.9). Room for further decline through expansion of immunization remains-the immunization rate against measles is still only about 60 percent in some of the region's most populous (Ethiopia) and resource-rich (the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, South Africa) countries. In Equatorial Guinea, where GDP per capita is more than $15,000 a year, only about one child in two is vaccinated against measles.
In 2000 less than $100 million was disbursed to malaria-endemic countries to fight malaria; in 2013 the figure was $1.97 billion. As a consequence, the number of children dying from malaria fell dramatically, 19.1 in South Africa, 21.9 percent in Botswana, 22.9 percent in Lesotho, and 27.4 percent in Swaziland). Prevalence rates of 5-7 percent are observed in East Africa (Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda) (map 3.1). Despite substantial progress and the increased availability of better treatment options, HIV/AIDs will continue to hold back life expectancy in a number of countries, especially in Southern but also in East Africa.
Nutrition. A healthy life is also reflected in good nutritional status, commonly measured by assessing height and weight. For adults the body mass index (BMI)-the ratio of weight to height-is often used. Very low BMIs are indicative of undernourishment; high BMI is how obesity is often defined. Systematic BMI measures are not available for men. Among women in Africa, 13 percent are underweight and 5 percent are obese (population-weighted averages from Demographic and Health Surveys 2006-12) .
Underweight is less common in middleincome countries and more prevalent in fragile states and, especially, resource-rich countries (where it is 3.7 percentage points higher than for non-resource-rich countries) (figure 3.10). This finding holds even after controlling for other country and household features, suggesting that policy choices underpin this poor health outcome in resource-rich countries. Malnutrition is more prevalent among poor households (by 3.2 percentage points) and in rural areas (by 1.6 percentage points). It declines with education. Widows, divorcées, and single women are at significantly greater risk than married women of being undernourished (by 2.7 percentage points). The role of marital status in women's health capabilities is an underappreciated aspect of well-being in Africa and highlights the importance of indicators of individual well-being (van de Walle and Milazzo 2015) .
Trends in obesity suggest that poor nutritional habits are accompanying rising incomes. The condition is most prevalent among highly-educated women, women in urban settings, and women in middle-income countries. Based on an extrapolation of the data shown in figure 3 .10, the total number of obese adults in Africa (both men and women) is estimated at 26.7 million. The figure is likely to reach epidemic proportions in the near future, presenting Africa with a new health challenge (Popkin 2001; Ziraba, Fotso, and Ochako 2009) .
The long-run nutritional status of young children, often measured by low height-forage (stunting) provides an important additional indicator of a population's capability of living a long and healthy life as well as an outlook on the future. 7 Chronically malnourished children face a higher risk of mortality and disease. Early growth retardation also impedes cognitive development and schooling achievements (Dercon and Portner 2014) .
The prevalence of stunting has been declining across Africa. It fell from 44.6 percent in 1995 to 38.6 percent in 2012 (DHS 2015) . Unlike in Asia, where there is a strong cultural preference for boys, who are therefore better fed, in Africa boys under five are more malnourished than girls (39.5 percent compared with 35.2 percent). This difference largely reflects biological differences in health and survival between boys and girls (Kraemer 2000; Waldron 1983) . If this biological disadvantage is not offset by cultural preferences for boys (as in Asia), higher malnutrition rates among boys result (Wamani and others 2007) .
The prevalence of stunting is high in Burundi (57 percent), Madagascar (50 percent), and Africa's most populous countriesNigeria (37 percent), Ethiopia (44 percent), and the Democratic Republic of Congo (42 percent). Only two countries (Gabon and Senegal) register rates under 20 percent. The overall level of development of a country matters for child nutrition, though other factors are likely even more important (Harttgen, Klasen, and Vollmer 2013) . Children born to educated women enjoy chances of proper growth development that are 9.9 percentage points higher (for secondary education) and 19.8 percentage points higher (for higher education). Children in poor, rural households with undernourished mothers are 20 percent more likely to be stunted. Everything else equal, being born in a fragile or resourcerich country also reduces one's chances of proper early childhood growth. A continued focus on increasing education among women will have dramatic and long-lasting effects on Africa's human capabilities.
Physical impairment and disability also deprive people of opportunities (capabilities) and the ability to do and be what they value (their functionings) (Mitra 2006) . As a group, the disabled are typically either undersampled or poorly identified in representative surveys and as a result often understudied. From a sample of seven countries across Africa on which comparable data are available, it appears that almost 1 working-age adult in 10 in Africa suffers from a disability, defined as reporting severe difficulties in moving about, concentrating, remembering, seeing or recognizing people across the road (while wearing glasses), or taking care of themselves (figure 3.11). The prevalence of disability ranges from 5.3 percent in Kenya to 13.0 percent in Malawi. The numbers are higher among women (10.6 percent) than men (7.3 percent). They are also higher in rural areas (9.9 percent) than urban areas (6.9 percent). Disability prevalence rates in Africa are similar to the average rates in the Asian and Latin American countries examined by Mitra, Posärac, and Vick (2013) .
Freedom from Violence
The ability to live free from violence affects people's survival, dignity, and daily life. Insecurity significantly reduces the choices a person can make regarding what to do and who to be (capabilities).
Afrobarometer data from 2010-12 indicate that insecurity is pervasive in Africa. In these surveys, 12 percent of respondents indicate that either they or a family member had been physically attacked at least once during the past year. Fifty-three percent indicated that they feared political intimidation or violence at least once during election campaigns; 40 percent indicated that they or a family member had felt unsafe at least once while walking in the neighborhood during the past year; and 33 percent report that they or a family member had feared crime in their home at least once in the past year.
Freedom from political violence. After years of multiple large-scale conflicts in the 1990s, Africa enjoyed a period of relative peace during the first decade of the 21st century (map 3.2). Between 1997 and 2014, the number of violent events against civilians more than quadrupled, reaching more than 4,000 in 2014. The number of victims per event declined (from 20 during the late 1990s to 4 in 2014), however, reflecting the changing nature of the events. The more conventional conflicts and civil wars of the 1990s (in Angola, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone) have receded in scale and intensity, but election-related violence, extremism, terror attacks, drug trafficking, maritime piracy, and criminality have been growing. Wars are increasingly being fought by armed insurgents on the periphery of factionalized and militarily weak states, such as the Arab and Tuareg uprisings in Mali and Boko Haram in Nigeria. West Africa has emerged as a key transit point in the trafficking of narcotics between Latin America and Europe, and piracy has expanded in the Gulf of Guinea.
In addition to undermining the basic functioning of being secure, conflict also affects many of the other functionings and opportunities that are critical to self-determination. It affects not only the people directly affected but also the broader population inside and outside the country (by, for example, creating internally displaced persons and refugees [box 3.3]). Countries suffering more than 100 casualties in a year experience a decline in economic growth of 2.3 percent. These effects can be long-lasting. Freedom from domestic violence. Physical and sexual violence (and the threat of such violence) at home are negatively associated with health outcomes, empowerment, employment trajectories, and the ability to engage in productive activities (Campbell 2002; Coker, Smith, and Fadden 2005; Duflo 2012; MacQuarrie, Winter, and Kishor 2013; Nyamayemombe and others 2010; Stöckl, Heise, and Watts 2012; Vyas 2013; Wayack, Gnoumou, and Kaboré 2013) . The effects also extend well beyond the direct victims. Children's health and educational achievements are impeded, and social norms that condone violence perpetuate it (Rico and others 2011). A child whose mother experienced domestic violence is more likely to become a victim or a perpetrator of such violence later in life (Kishor and Johnson 2004) correlated with acceptance, also fell. Acceptance of domestic violence in the region is still exceptionally high, however (30 percent), more than twice the average in the rest of the developing world (14 percent) (figure 3.14). Most African refugees remain in Africa. Since 2005 the region has also been receiving a large inflow of refugees from North Africa and, since 2013, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, bringing the total number of refugees in Africa to 5.6 million.
Socioeconomic data on refugees and IDPs during or immediately after conflicts are scant. A recent study tracking the welfare of people displaced during the 2012 crisis in northern Mali sheds some light on the consequences (Etang-Ndip, Hoogeveen, and Lendorfer 2015). Welfare losses were substantial: the value of durable assets fell by 20-60 percent, and the value of livestock declined by 75-90 percent. But loss of welfare and wealth is only part of the story. In June 2014, 52 percent of the IDPs in Bamako felt insecure on the street at night, and 30 percent felt insecure during the day. The share rose to 85 percent among returnees in Gao and Kidal.
Fourteen percent of IDPs, 4 percent of returnees, and 1 percent of refugees reported that they had experienced death or physical violence within their household. Overall, better-educated and wealthier households managed to flee the conflict area; poorer people had to stay behind. Among people who returned by 2014, mainly IDPs, escape seemed to have helped them mitigate the effects of violence. They suffered less than the average population of northern Mali. But many people also responded to the crisis by leaving the country, and refugee situations often become protracted, extending the suffering (Kreibaum 2014) .
Over the past decade there has been an expansion of microhousehold studies examining the evolution of well-being among refugees, host communities, and returnees. These studies show refugees also as economically active people who often engage in entrepreneurship; they are not always worse off than nonrefugees or the hosting communities, partly because of the support received. Singh and others (2005) find, for example, no difference in underfive mortality rates between refugee and nonrefugee households in western Uganda and South Sudan. In contrast, Verwimp and Van Bavel (2005) find higher under-five mortality rates and fertility among (former) Rwandan refugees in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Verwimp and Van Bavel (2013) report a reduction in schooling among Burundi children associated with displacement that is distinct from the effects of exposure to violence.
Insights from three country case studies (of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda) suggest that the local economy often benefits from the influx of refugees, through increased demand for local goods and services and better connectivity following investment in new roads and transport services to reach the camps (Maystadt and Verwimp 2015) . But not everyone benefits. The landless and agricultural workers, whom refugees may compete with on the labor market, and net food buyers suffer, at least in the short run.
BOX 3.3 What happens to Africans who flee their homes?
Both the levels of and changes in acceptance of violence vary widely across countries. Women's acceptance of domestic violence is deeply engrained in some countries (77 percent acceptance rates in Mali and Uganda); in others, only small minorities accept domestic violence (13 percent in Malawi, 16 percent in Benin) (figure 3.15). Declining acceptance does not always translate into declining incidence, however. In Malawi, for example, while acceptance decreased 13 percentage points, incidence rose almost 1 percentage point. In Mali incidence increased 8 percent, but there was no change in acceptance rates. Acceptance of domestic violence is much greater among women in resource-rich (16 percent) and fragile (9 percent) countries (controlling for other country traits) (figure 3.16) . Surprisingly, tolerance of violence is also greater among younger women; it declines with age, possibly because its incidence rises (domestic violence is more common in the 20-35 age group than among the 15-19 age group). Tolerance of violence fell by 1.7 percent a year between 2000 and 2013 and the incidence of violence fell by 0.6 percent, but no broad generational shift in mindset has yet occurred.
A main distinguishing factor in acceptance is education. Better-educated women are 31 percent less likely to be tolerant of domestic violence than women with no education, and women with secondary education are 16 percent less likely to be tolerant. Education is not associated with a lower incidence of domestic violence, however. In fact, women with primary and secondary education are more than 10 percent more likely to have experienced domestic violence than uneducated women, among whom incidence rates are similar to rates among women with higher education.
Income reduces tolerance of domestic violence, especially in upper-middle-income and high-income countries and the richest segments within countries. Women in the richest quintile are 7.1 percent less likely than women in the poorest quintile to be tolerant of domestic violence. The incidence of domestic violence is just 3.9 percent lower, however. Africa's upper-middle-income and high-income countries have higher rates of domestic violence (despite lower acceptance rates) than poorer countries. After controlling for age, educational attainment, and income, there is no discernable difference between rural and urban areas.
Freedom to Decide
The second critical dimension of the capability approach is the ability to shape one's life-that is, to determine what one values. This dimension concerns opportunities. A woman who cannot leave her house without her husband's permission or who has no say about her own health is not free to determine her choices in life. Homosexuals who are afraid of revealing their sexual orientation for fear of persecution are constrained in their life choices.
People gain access to a broader set of opportunities if they can participate in the processes that affect their lives and are allowed to make their own choices. These choices are often politically and socially constrained. K e n y a T a n z a n i a R w a n d a U g a n d a S e n e g a l N i g e r WGI scores range from −2.5 to 2.5 units in a normal standard distribution. The WGI data indicate that perceptions of political constraints have not changed much worldwide in the past few years, although there was a slight improvement in Africa, albeit from low levels ( figure 3.17) . The region is doing better than the Middle East and North Africa and East Asia and Pacific.
Improvements have been especially noteworthy in West Africa (Burkina Faso, Ghana, Liberia, Niger, and Nigeria) ( figure 3.18) . Countries that experienced a large decline in their voice and accountability scores include the Central African Republic, Eritrea, Gabon, and Madagascar. The results for country groupings are consistent with the findings about education, health, and violence. Countries that are resource rich or fragile are less well off than countries that are not (by −0.5 units each), and upper-middle-income and high-income countries score 0.6 points higher than low-income countries, controlling for other country traits. The WGI findings are highly correlated with the findings of the Afrobarometer. 8 There is no systematic difference in perceptions of political freedoms by gender and area of residence (rural or urban).
The second measure of freedom to decide reflects the ability to make informed decisions. Access to media provides an important source of information, and educational attainment helps people digest the information and act on it.
Almost 40 percent of Africans do not regularly listen to the radio, watch television, or read a newspaper at least once a week (figure 3.19) . Exposure to the media is lower in Africa than in the rest of the developing world (excluding China), where only 25 percent of the population lacks regular media exposure. African countries with high media exposure (more than 80 percent of the population exposed) include Gabon, Ghana, and Kenya. Media exposure is typically lower around the Sahel, in many of the coastal countries of West Africa, and in Africa's populous countries (the Democratic Republic of Congo and Ethiopia), where only about 40 percent of the population have regular access to the media. There is also an important gender gap. On This dimension is not so much about democracy per se but about the degree to which political systems give people voice and participation in the processes that affect their lives at all levels of society. It is about not only political freedom and participation but also social norms and the freedom to decide about routine matters in life, including within the household. Constraints can be based on gender, religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation, or other reasons.
Indicators that measure freedom to decide are often not available, particularly at the individual level. We draw on three measures: a country-level measure of voice and accountability, as a broad indicator of enabling the expression of voice; exposure to mass media, as an indicator of access to information to inform decisions; and the extent to which women have control over decision making in various domains of living.
The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project scores countries in terms of voice and accountability. It captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's population is able to participate in selecting the government and enjoy freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. average media access is 15 percentage points lower among women than men (54 percent versus 69 percent). Poverty, rural residence, and lack of education are key differentiators. Media access is also 6 percent lower in resource-rich countries and 5 percent lower T o m é a n d P r í n c i p e S w a z i l a n d G h a n a S e n e g a l U g a n d a L e s o t h o S o u t h S u d a n R w a n d a The third set of indicators of freedom to decide are measures of decision making in the lives of women from household surveys.
Source: Latest available Demographic and Health Surveys 1994-2013. Note: Exposure to mass media means a person listened to the radio, watched TV, or read the newspaper at least once a week. Developing world excludes Africa and is population-weighted. Africa average is population-weighted.
G a b o n S ã o
T o m é a n d P r í n c i p e N a m i b i a S w a z i l a n d G h a n a K e n y a S e n e g a l U g a n d a L e s o t h o D e v e l o p i n g w o r l d R w a n d a C e n t r a l A f r i c a n R e p u b l i c Z a m b i a T a n z a n i a C o n g o , R e p . such participation increases with age is consistent with the trends in women's attitudes toward domestic violence.
The final decision on whether a married woman can visit friends or family lies with the husband alone in 40 percent of African households, compared with 33 percent in the rest of the developing world. Control over a women's earnings lies fully with someone else in only 10 percent of households. Overall, the general trend in Africa is toward greater participation of women in household decisionmaking processes.
Multiple Deprivation
Thus far this chapter has examined the region's well-being by assessing progress on each functioning and capability separately. Using a dashboard approach (listing achievements by dimension) instead of aggregating the measures into an index avoids having to assign weights to different dimensions. 9 It also allows researchers to draw on different datasets. It does not require a measure of several dimensions of poverty (for the same individual or household) simultaneously. From a practical perspective, policies typically aim to address shortcomings in a particular dimension (education, health care, the incidence of violence). The gains from combining scores across dimensions to obtain a complete ranking may be limited.
These advantages come at the expense of being able to assess the extent to which people suffer multiple deprivations. People suffering in different dimensions are arguably worse off than people suffering in one dimension. Omission of valuable dimensions underestimates their poverty, especially when dimensions are poorly correlated (that is, when they are poor substitutes or poor complements). 10 In addition, the deprivation associated with simultaneous deprivation in two dimensions may well be worse than twice the deprivation associated with each of them. As a result, country rankings may differ when simultaneity in deprivations is considered. Consider, for example, two countries with 20 people.
In Country A, 10 people are illiterate and the other 10 are in poor health. In Country B, 10 people are both illiterate and in poor health and the other 10 are literate and healthy. Under the dashboard approach, which considers poverty dimension by dimension, both countries are equally poor (10 people are deprived in each dimension). But because the deprivation associated with simultaneous deprivation in two dimensions may be worse than the sum of the deprivations associated with each of them, the case could be made that B is poorer. The dashboard approach ignores jointness in deprivation.
Important insights regarding the degree of interdependency can be obtained by counting the number of dimensions in which an individual is deprived and calculating the shares of the population deprived in a given number of dimensions (Ferreira and Lugo 2013) . This counting approach does not require that weights be imposed on dimensions or that the degree to which deprivations are substitutable be determined (Atkinson 2003) . This approach is akin to the MPI proposed by Alkire and Foster (2011) , but it does not impose a number of deprivations to qualify as poor. By capturing the essence of the interest in multidimensional poverty, it provides a middle ground between the dashboard approach (Ravallion 2011) , which ignores jointness in deprivation, and the scalar MPI, which assigns a minimum number of deprivations for a person to qualify as poor (Alkire and Foster 2011; Decancq and Lugo 2013) .
Measuring multidimensional deprivation requires information on each dimension for the same individual. To look at Africa wide patterns, such information is available only for women of reproductive age from 25 countries covered in the DHS. Proxy indicators for the four dimensions are used (box 3.4). Considering each dimension separately (as in the dashboard approach), about one adult woman in two is illiterate (56 percent), exposed to violence (54 percent), or insufficiently empowered (51 percent), and about one in seven (14 percent) is undernourished. For the four dimensions considered here, the average woman suffers 1.75 deprivations (56 + 54 + 51 + 14 = 175/100).
Does everyone suffer equally, or is deprivation concentrated among a subset of the population? Under a perfectly equal distribution of deprivations, everyone would be deprived in 1.75 dimensions. Under perfect concentration (or full inequality), all deprivations would be concentrated within a single group: 43.7 percent (175/4) of the population would suffer in each of these four dimensions, while the remaining 56.3 percent would be deprivation free. The larger the share of people suffering in three or more dimensions, the more concentrated is the deprivation.
Deprivation among African women is widespread: more than four women in five (86 percent) are deprived in at least one dimension; only 14 percent are free of deprivation (figure 3.21). Multiple deprivation characterizes a sizable group of women: almost one woman in three is poor in three or four dimensions; 55 percent suffer in one or two dimensions. Deprivation is widespread, but for a sizable group it is also highly concentrated: about one-third of women realize only one functioning or none at all.
Multiple deprivations and the concentration of deprivation are more common among women with less wealth: 42 percent of assetpoor women versus 18 percent of non-assetpoor women are deprived in at least three To measure deprivation in multiple dimensions, we use data from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) on 25 countries, covering 72 percent of the population of Africa. We focus on the four areas of deprivation discussed earlier. Illiteracy is defined as being unable to read a full sentence, being blind, or having no reading card for the required language. More than half (56 percent) of women in the sample countries are illiterate.
Women are classified as deprived in health if they are undernourished (BMI below 18.5). There is no direct information on life expectancy. The correlation coefficient between country life expectancy and the proportion of undernourished women is 0.3.
Women's attitudes toward domestic violence are used as an indicator of physical security. Across countries, social norms toward domestic violence and the incidence of casualties from political violence are correlated (the correlation coefficient is 0.4).
Freedom to decide is measured by an indicator capturing lack of frequent media exposure (not using at least one media channel [newspaper, television, radio] at least once a week) or not being involved in decisions regarding own health care, family visits, or spending. Both indicators are correlated with the Worldwide Governance Indicator of voice and accountability (correlation coefficient is 0.4).
For comparison, we augment these dimensions by adding a fifth aspect: asset poverty. We use the DHS asset index to classify women as asset poor or nonpoor (Christiaensen and Stifel 2007; Filmer and Scott 2012; Sahn and ↑ dimensions. But three out of four non-assetpoor women suffer at least one deprivation, confirming that income poverty provides only a partial picture of a population's well-being. Multiple deprivation is more prevalent among younger women: women 35-49 experience on average half the deprivation of women 15-19 (figure 3.22) . After controlling for education and illiteracy, tolerance for domestic violence and social control over one's actions tend to decline with age. This evidence suggests that there is a positive dynamic as life progresses, but it is also Poor women experience 0.6 more deprivations than rich women, and rural women suffer 0.5 more deprivations than urban women, holding other factors constant. As these women also have lower levels of education and poverty is more prevalent in rural areas, the unadjusted gaps are much larger. Multiple deprivations are also more common in low-income, fragile, and resourcerich states. Multiple deprivation is 10 percent higher in resource-rich countries. Countries in West Africa and the Sahel (Guinea, Mali, Niger) display high levels of multiple deprivation, as do Africa's most populous countries (map 3.3): the share of women suffering three or more deprivations is 68 percent in Ethiopia, 40 percent in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and 22 percent in Nigeria. High rates of multiple deprivation in these populous countries partly explain the large share of multidimensional poverty in Africa, where 31 percent of women in the 25 countries studied are deprived in three dimensions or more. Cabo Verde 0%-10% (4 countries) 10%-20% (7 countries) 20%-30% (7 countries) 30%-40% (1 countries) 40%-100% (6 countries)
No data

Percent of women deprived in at least three dimensions
The approach adopted here is similar to the MPI approach proposed by Alkire and Foster (2011) (box 3.5) . To illustrate this similarity, figure 3.23 displays the share of the population in each country that is deprived in one, two, three, and four dimensions. Countries are ranked by the share of the population deprived in three or more dimensions.
In Alkire/Foster notation, figure 3.23 ranks countries based on a multidimensional poverty rate based on k of 3, with no adjustment for intensity of deprivation (A). Using the MPI, that is adjusting the results in figure  3 .23 for A, does not change the ranking. Mitra, Posärac, and Vick (2013) use this approach to compare poverty among abled Considering the share of women deprived in one, two, three, … k dimensions (with k the total number of dimensions considered) is similar to one of the family of multidimensional poverty measures proposed by Alkire and Foster (2011) . They use two thresholds to determine whether a person is multidimensionally poor: a dimension-specific cutoff to determine whether he or she is deprived in each dimension and a dimension threshold (k) that is the number of dimensions in which a person needs to be deprived to be considered multidimensionally poor. Relative rather than equal weighting of the dimensions can be applied. The second cutoff is then a proportion (not the number) of weighted deprivations. The multidimensional poverty rate (H) is the share of the population that is poor in at least k dimensions.
Alkire and Foster also consider the intensity of deprivations (A), the average number of dimensions in which the multidimensionally poor are deprived. Adjusting the multidimensional poverty rate (H) for deprivation intensity (A) helps differentiate countries with an equal share of multidimensionally poor. A country in which 30 percent of women have three deprivations and none has four would rank higher than a country in which 30 percent of women are multi dimensionally poor but half of them suffer four deprivations. The MPI can then be written as M = H × A.
BOX 3.5 What is the multidimensional poverty index (MPI)?
Source: Data from Demographic and Health Surveys 2005-13. Note: Countries are ranked by the share of the female adult population deprived in at least three out of four dimensions. 
Concluding Remarks
This chapter reviews Africa's progress since the mid-1990s in a number of nonmonetary dimensions of poverty. The dimensions include education and health, two focus areas of the Millennium Development Goals, as well as freedom from violence and freedom to decide. Wider data availability makes this possible, though some measurement issues remain, even when tracking traditional indicators, such as adult literacy. Progress has been achieved in all four domains, albeit with wide variation across countries and population groups. Between 1996 and 2012, Africa's adult literacy rates rose 4 percentage points, the gender gap shrank, and gross primary enrollment rates increased dramatically. Life expectancy at birth rose 6.2 years, and the prevalence of chronic malnutrition among under-five-year-olds fell 6 percentage points (to 38.6 percent). The number of deaths from politically motivated violence declined, and tolerance and the incidence of gender-based domestic violence dropped 10 percentage points each. Scores on the voice and accountability indicators rose slightly, and women's participation in household decision-making processes increased.
This progress notwithstanding, levels of deprivation remain high in all domains and the rate of progress has leveled off. Despite substantial increases in school enrollments, more than two out of five adults in Africa cannot read or write, and the quality of schooling is poor. Improving Africa's primary educational outcomes is urgent. Health outcomes mirror the results for literacy. Progress is happening, but outcomes are still the worst in the world. Increases in immunization and bednet coverage are slowing. Nearly two in five African children is malnourished, one in eight adult women is underweight, and obesity is emerging as a new health concern.
Africans enjoyed considerably more peace in the 2000s than before, but since 2010 the number of violent events has been four times what it was in the mid-1990s. Violence in Africa is experienced not only in terms of political unrest and large-scale civil conflicts but also in the form of domestic violence. At 30 percent, tolerance of domestic violence is twice as high as in the rest of the developing world and the incidence of domestic violence is more than 50 percent higher. Higher tolerance of domestic violence and less empowered decision making among younger (compared with older) women suggest that a generational shift in mindset is still to come. On voice and accountability, Africa remains among the bottom performers, albeit with slightly higher scores than countries in the Middle East and North Africa and East Asia and Pacific.
Around these region-wide trends is remarkable variation across countries and population groups. Rural populations and the income poor are worse off in all domains, though other factors, such as gender and female education, often matter as much or more and at times in unexpected ways. Women in Africa can, for example, expect to live in good health 1.6 years longer than men, and boys under five years are 5 percentage points more likely to be malnourished than girls. At the same time, the gender gap in literacy remains substantial, women suffer more than men from violence (especially domestic violence), and they are more curtailed in their access to information and decision making. Literacy is especially low in West Africa, where gender disparities are large. High HIV prevalence rates are holding life expectancy back in Southern Africa. Conflict events are concentrated in the greater Horn of Africa and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The low levels of Africa's capability achievements are driven partly by below-average performance in its three most populous countries (Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Ethiopia). Multiple deprivations characterize life for a sizable share of African women (data on men are unavailable).
Two important findings stand out. First, fragile and resource-rich countries tend to perform worse and middle-income countries better than other countries. This finding confirms the pernicious effects of conflict and is consistent with the widely observed association with overall economic development. People in resource-rich countries experience a resource penalty in their human development outcomes. They are less literate (by 3.1 percentage points), have shorter average life spans (by 4.5 years) and higher rates of malnutrition among women (by 3.7 percentage points) and children (by 2.1 percentage points), suffer more from domestic violence (by 9 percentage points), and have less voice and accountability than people in nonresource-rich countries. 11 Women's education (secondary schooling and above) makes a decisive difference across dimensions (health, violence, and freedom in decision), among both adults and children. Improving women's education and socioeconomic opportunities can be game changing for Africa's capability achievement.
Notes
1. UNDP (1990, page 10) describes the HDI as follows: "Human development is a process of enlarging people's choices. In principle, these choices can be infinite and change over time. But at all levels of development, the three essential ones are for people to lead a long and healthy life, to acquire knowledge and to have access to resources needed for a decent standard of living. If these essential choices are not available, many other opportunities remain inaccessible." 2. UNESCO (2015) discusses reasons for limited progress in global adult literacy since the 2000s, including the underperformance of adult literacy programs. All progress has come from better literacy among younger cohorts. 3. The gross enrollment ratio can exceed 100 percent because of the inclusion of over-age and under-age students following early or late school entrance and grade repetition. 4. Higher life expectancy for women is possible even in an environment that is disadvantageous to them, given that women are genetically pre disposed to live longer (Sen 2002; World Bank 2011 Filmer (2013) also find no effect of GDP on adult mortality in Africa and relatively little effect of recent conflict, unless the conflicts escalated, as in the Rwandese genocide. Elsewhere in the world GDP is negatively correlated with adult mortality. 6. The increase in funding has slowed in recent years, causing both the increase in the use of treated bednets and the decline in child mortality from malaria to level off (WHO 2013 (WHO , 2014b . 7. Children are considered stunted if their height-for-age is more than two standard deviations from the median height-for-age of the reference population. 8. There is a high correlation between the WGI's voice and accountability score and the responses from 35 African countries to the Afrobarometer's "freedom to say what you think" (0.67) and "freedom to join any political organization" (0.65) questions; the correlation with "the extent of democracy" is 0.58. Because the Afrobarometer does not measure free media but only exposure to mass media, the correlation with the WGI's voice and accountability score is slightly lower.
9. The debate about defining weights is lively (see Alkire and Foster 2011 and critiques by Ravallion 2011) . Some of it concerns whether deprivations should be treated as substitutes or complements (Bourguignon and Chakravarty 2003) . Appropriate weights should reflect ethically or empirically grounded trade-offs among the components of deprivation (see Decancq and Lugo 2013; Ferreira and Lugo 2013) ; they should not be set for the sake of convenience. 10. At the country level, there is limited correlation in the population shares of people deprived in the four dimensions. The correlation coefficient is 0.22 on average (in absolute value); it ranges from 0.12 (for the correlation between the voice and accountability indicator and the illiteracy indicator) to 0.39 (for the correlation between the voice and accountability indicator and the indicator of the number of fatalities from violence). This low correlation is consistent with lack of interchangeability across functionings and capabilities (as emphasized by the capability approach). The overlap is greatest in the prevalence of $1.25 income poverty (33 percent) for asset-poverty and each of the other four dimensions, which could be seen as providing support for the welfarist (monetary poverty) approach to measuring poverty (that asset poverty is an indicator of multiple deprivation). Yet, even though the overlap is highest, the correlation remains nonetheless rather low, underscoring that income poverty remains a rather incomplete proxy for well-being and that good scores on income poverty hide deprivation in many basic functionings and capabilities. 11. De la Brière and others (2015) discuss how resource-rich countries could harness their mineral wealth to build more human capital.
